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CANADA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE
NORTHWEST PASSAGE
Donat Pharand*
In 1968, when this writer published "Innocent Passage in the Arctic,"' Canada had yet to assert its sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. It has since done so by establishing, in 1985, straight baselines
around the whole of its Arctic Archipelago. In August of that year,
the U. S. Coast Guard vessel PolarSea made a transit of the Northwest Passage on its voyage from Thule, Greenland, to the Chukchi Sea
(see Route 1 on Figure 1). Having been notified of the impending
transit, Canada informed the United States that it considered all the
waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago as historic internal waters
and that a request for authorization to transit the Northwest Passage
would be necessary. The United States refused to make such a request, taking the position that the Northwest Passage was an international strait. As a result, the two governments agreed that the crossing
of the Polar Sea would take place without prejudice to their respective
legal positions.
The incident aroused deep emotion in Canada and, the very next
month, the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced a
number of measures to enable Canada to exercise effective control over
the Arctic waters generally and those of the Northwest Passage in particular. Two of the measures are of special importance: the construction of a class 8 icebreaker and the establishment of straight baselines
around the Arctic Archipelago. The latter is of particular legal significance and will be discussed here.
In his announcement, the Minister specified that the baselines defined "the outer limits of Canada's historic internal waters."'2 In order
to make it clear that Canada stood ready to have the International
Court adjudicate on the validity of its sovereignty claim over the waters of the Archipelago, the Minister announced at the same time that
the Government was withdrawing the 1970 reservation to its accept* Q.C., S.J.D., F.R.S.C. Emeritus Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. Consultant, International Law, Law of the Sea and Arctic Affairs. LL.M. 1968, S.J.D. 1972, University of Michigan.
1. See 6 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1968). The article was originally written as a paper in a
seminar on the Law of the Sea taught by Professor Bishop, and was published at his suggestion.
2. Statement in House of Commons, Sept. 10, 1985, reproduced in Department of External
Affairs, Communiqud No. 85/49, at page 3.
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ance of the Court's jurisdiction. That reservation, made at the time of
the adoption of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, covered
disputes relating to the prevention and control of marine pollution in
Arctic waters.
In this writer's opinion, there can be only two legal bases for Canada's claim: an historic title and the straight baselines themselves.
The sector theory, occasionally invoked in the past by Canada, cannot
serve as a legal basis for a claim to sovereignty in general nor one to
maritime sovereignty in particular. 3 Consequently, this paper will
confine itself to examining the two legal bases mentioned above. It
will then address the question of the status of the Northwest Passage,
both before and after the establishment of straight baselines. This latter examination is all the more necessary now that the United States
persists in the view that a right to transit passage (or the equivalent)
exists in the Northwest Passage. It should be understood at the outset
that, for the purposes of this paper, the Northwest Passage refers to
the constricted waters within the Canadian Arctic Archipelago between Baffin Bay and the Beaufort Sea.
I.

CANADA'S CLAIM OF HISTORIC TITLE TO THE WATERS OF ITS

ARCTIC ARCHIPELAGO

A.

Legal Requirements of Historic Waters

The doctrine of historic waters emerged during the 19th century as
an enlargement of the doctrine of historic bays and has been preserved
in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of
1958, as well as in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Although the role of historic waters in international law has been considerably reduced both since the approval of the straight baseline system for coastal archipelagos by the International Court of Justice in
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case of 1951, and since the incorporation of a 24-mile closing line rule for bays in the Territorial Sea Convention of 1958, historic waters continue to be accepted in general
international law. The Conventions do recognize that the 24-mile
closing line for bays (the maximum length), does not apply to historic
bays and that the equidistance rule for the delimitation of territorial
waters between neighboring States does not apply when an historic
title exists. The Conventions, however, are completely silent as to the
legal requirements for the existence of historic waters. Fortunately, a
number of authoritative studies have been made and it is generally
3. For a study of the sector theory as a possible basis for Canada's claim, see D.
CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988).
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agreed that three requirements must be met before a claim to historic
waters is established. These are: the exclusive exercise of State authority, long usage or the passage of time, and the acquiescence of
foreign States. In addition, there is the matter of burden of proof.
(1) Exclusive Exercise of State Authority
Because a claim to historic waters is one over a maritime area
which the coastal State considers an integral part of its national territory, the type of jurisdiction exercised over that area should be essentially the same as that being exercised over the rest of the territory.
More precisely, the coastal State must exercise an effective control
over the maritime area being claimed to the exclusion of all other
States. Naturally, the extent of control will vary, depending on the
size of the maritime area, its remoteness and the degree of its usability..
In remote areas such as the Arctic, for example, the actual control
might be limited, but nonetheless sufficient. Nevertheless, the claimant State must be able to show that it took whatever action necessary
to assert and maintain its exclusive authority over the area in question.
The best evidence, of course, would be the exclusion of foreign vessels
or their subjection to special permission.
(2)

Long Usage

How much passage of time must take place before a sufficiently
long usage is attained cannot be determined in the abstract. As for the
formation of a custom, it is impossible to determine in advance how
long the effective control must last before it materializes into an historic title. A variety of terms are employed to describe the length of
time required for a usage to have legal effect. The more common expressions used to qualify the required usage are: "well established usage," "continuous usage of long standing," "continued and well
established usage," "immemorial usage," and usage "from time
immemorial."
(3) Acquiescence by Foreign States
Everybody agrees that the attitude of foreign States - particularly
those primarily affected by the usage in question - is important, and
that some form of acquiescence is necessary before an historic title can
arise. Whether mere silence or the absence of protest could constitute
acquiescence is questionable. However, it is clear that an effective protest on the part of interested States would rebut the presumption of
acquiescence, which would normally arise out of a long period of total
toleration. To have this legal effect, the protest must be a real one and
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must usually be followed by some more forceful steps by the protesting
State. If such a State is really concerned about the possibility of an
historic title arising, it ought to take all permissible means at its disposal to prevent the practice or exercise of authority from developing
into an historic title. Naturally, the effectiveness of a protest will depend on a number of factors, such as the importance of the interest of
the protesting State, its geographical situation, its political strength,
and whether it is the sole protestor.
(4)

Burden of Proof

There appears to be a general consensus that the onus of establishing the existence of an historic title to maritime areas rests with the
coastal State making such a claim. In the Fisheries Case, both the
United Kingdom and Norway agreed that the burden of proof rested
with the Party claiming an exceptional right, but they disagreed as to
the scope of the burden of proof. Since the Norwegian claim of sovereignty over the waters landward of the baselines was established, not
on the basis of an historic title, but rather on an historic consolidation
of the straight baseline system, the Court held that a general toleration
on the part of foreign States was sufficient. 4 Consequently, there was
no special burden of proof on Norway as there would have been if its
case had rested solely on historical title.
B.

Appraisal of Canada's Claim of Historic Waters

There are both strengths and weaknesses to Canada's claim.

(1) Strengths
Prior to the transfer of the islands to Canada in 1880, virtually all
of the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago had been discovered
by British explorers and frequented practically only by them and British whalers. After the transfer, Canada patrolled most of those waters. Beginning with the more southern ones such as Hudson Bay and
Strait, Frobisher Bay and Cumberland Sound, Canada extended its
patrols to Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait and the connecting inlets
and sounds to the south. Canada adopted legislation in 1906 requiring
whalers to obtain a license when hunting whales in Hudson Bay and
the territorial waters north of the Fiftieth parallel. This legislation
was enforced until the end of whaling in the Arctic waters around
1915. Indeed, whaling licenses appear to have been issued for whaling
beyond the limits of territorial waters.
4. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, at 138 (Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951).
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In 1922, the Eastern Arctic Patrol was instituted and annual patrols were made until at least 1958. These patrols extended occasionally to the western Arctic waters and were carried out mostly by the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In 1926, the Arctic Islands Preserve
was adopted to protect the natives and wildlife, and to indicate that
Canada controlled the area within the sector formed by the 60th and
141st degrees of longitude. This was followed in 1929 by the Game
Regulations applicable in the Preserve.
After World War II, the Canadian Coast Guard was established.
Its main functions consisted of icebreaking services and the resupply
of Arctic communities. It has provided icebreaking services in particular for the few foreign transits of the Northwest Passage which have
taken place so far, including that of the Manhattan in 1969. The
Coast Guard also implements the regulations relating to pollution prevention and shipping safety control adopted under the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act of 1970.
Since 1970, Canadian survey ships have been active in charting the
waters of the Archipelago, particularly the straits which are expected
to be used eventually for the transportation of hydrocarbons from the
Beaufort Sea and the Arctic islands. In 1977, Canada instituted the
NORDREG reporting system which provides for all ships to report to
the Coast Guard before entering the waters of the Archipelago. 5
(2)

Weaknesses

On the negative side of Canada's claim of historic waters, it must
be realized that both British and Canadian explorers confined their
takings of possession to lands and islands. Even the formal taking of
possession by Captain J. E. Bernier on July 1, 1909, of the whole Arctic Archipelago lying to the north of America from longitude 60 W.
to 141 W. up to latitude 90 N., has to be interpreted as being limited
to the land areas. Bernier himself stated in his report on that expedition that he had received "specific instructions as to the waters to be
patrolled and explored, and lands to be annexed."' 6 In addition, the
sector theory which was implicit in the formulation of this taking of
possession is of no legal value as a basis for a claim of sovereignty in
7
international law, even if such claim is restricted to lands and islands.
Also on the negative side are the official explanations given in 1970
5. For a more complete review of British and Canadian activities in Arctic waters, see D.
PHARAND, THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE: ARCTIC STRAITS 22-58 (1984).

6. J. BERNIER, CRUISE OF THE ARCTIC 1908-1909 1 (1910). See also, Bernier's letter of April
5, 1910, to the Deputy Minister of Marine and Fisheries that accompanied his report, Id., at xix.
7. See D. PHARAND, supra note 3.
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on the legal effect of Canada's adoption of a 12-mile territorial sea on
the waters of the Northwest Passage after the passage of the Manhattan. The intended effect of extending the territorial sea from 3 to 12
miles must have been to create an overlap of territorial sea in the western portion of the Barrow Strait, where a string of five islands lies in a
zigzag fashion across the strait. The widest passage being only 15.5
miles, between Lowther and Young Islands, there would now be an
overlap of territorial waters in Barrow Strait, as there was already in
Prince of Wales Strait, where the Princess Royal Islands, lying in midstrait, reduce the width of the passage to less than six miles. This
intended effect was made abundantly clear by the legal advisor of the
Department of External Affairs, when testifying before the Standing
Committee on External Affairs and National Defense. He stated, in
particular, that the new 12-mile territorial sea had the effect of giving
Canada sovereignty from shore to shore, thus insuring undisputed
control over two of the gateways to the Northwest Passage. 8 In other
words, even if a foreign ship succeeded in avoiding Prince of Wales
Strait, as the Manhattan had attempted to do in 1969 by entering
M'Clure Strait instead, it could no longer remain on a strip of high
seas but would have to cross Canada's territorial waters. Such an explanation may well constitute an admission that the rest of the waters
of Parry Channel was considered as high seas. Of related significance
is that it was not until three years later, in 1973, that Canadian officials
said the waters of the Archipelago were historically internal waters of
Canada. 9
In addition the United States made a formal protest in 1970, not
only against Canada's extension of its territorial sea to 12 miles, but
also against the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention legislation
adopted at the same time. This second piece of legislation enabled
Canada to enforce certain pollution prevention standards of construction, manning, and equipment against all ships navigating in the waters of the Archipelago north of the sixtieth parallel and up to a
distance of one hundred miles outside the Archipelago. The United
States Protest Note stated that international law provided no basis for
the proposed unilateral extension of jurisdiction and that it could
neither accept nor acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction.' 0
8. See Canadian Parliament House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs
and National Defense, MINUTES OF PROC. & EVID, No. 25, 28th Pan., 2d sess. 18 (1970) (Statement of J. Beesley).
9. Letter from the Bureau of Legal Affairs for the Department of External Affairs (Dec. 17,
1973), reprinted in 12 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 277, at 279 (1974).
10. See Protest Note, reproduced in U.S. Press Preleases Appendix A, in CanadianHouse of
Commons Debates, at 5923 (April 15, 1970).
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The Note ended by suggesting to Canada that the matter be submitted
to the International Court of Justice for adjudication. Canada ignored
the Protest Note as it related to the extension of the territorial sea, but
not so with respect to pollution prevention. Indeed, on the same day
on which the Government introduced the Bill on Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention, the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations
transmitted a letter to the Secretary General modifying Canada's acceptance of the International Court's jurisdiction and excepting from
such jurisdiction disputes arising out of Canada's claim relating to the
prevention or control of pollution in marine areas adjacent to the coast
of Canada.
The damaging part of this reservation in relation to Canada's claim
of historic waters is that the marine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada, as described in the new legislation, covered not only a strip of 100
miles outside of the Archipelago but also all of the waters within the
Archipelago north of the seventieth parallel. If the waters of the Archipelago had really been considered as internal waters of Canada,
over which it claimed as complete a sovereignty as it did over the
lands and islands, there would have been no doubt as to Canada's jurisdiction to adopt such legislation for the waters within the Archipelago. Thus, the reservation could have been limited to the strip of 100
miles outside the Archipelago and along the northern coast of the
Yukon and the Mackenzie Delta. As it was, the reservation indicated
an uncertainty on the part of Canada as to the legal basis of this legislation, not only as it applied to the waters outside but apparently also
as to the waters inside the Archipelago. Consequently, Canada cannot
be said to have ignored the protest of the United States, but on the
contrary, seems to have acted upon it.
For the reasons just outlined, the conclusion is that Canada would
not succeed in establishing that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are historic internal waters. "
II.

CANADA'S STRAIGHT BASELINES AROUND
ITS ARCTIC ARCHIPELAGO

The method of delimiting territorial waters from straight baselines,
instead of from the sinuosities of the coast, was developed by Norway
beginning in 1812. The straight baseline system was approved by the
International Court in 1951. It was incorporated with a few changes
in the Convention on the Territorial Sea of 1958 and retained in the
11. For a contrary conclusion, however, see Rigaldies, Le statut des eaux de I'Archipelaarctique canadien, 2 ESPACES ET RESOURCES MARITIMES 46, 102 (1987).
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Law of the Sea Convention of 1982. Under this system, where a coast
is deeply indented or is bordered by an archipelago, it is permissible to
draw straight baselines across the indentations and between the outermost points of the islands, and measure the territorial sea from those
baselines. This latter type of geographical situation is commonly referred to as coastal archipelago. This section will review the law applicable for the use of straight baselines and will enquire whether the
Canadian Arctic Archipelago meets the requirements for the application of such baselines.
A.

Legal Requirementsfor Straight Baselines

Although the establishment of straight baselines is completely
within the control of the coastal State, the validity of lines depends on
whether they fulfill the requirements of international law. Those requirements pertain to the geographical configuration on the coast and
the way in which the straight baselines are established.
(1)

GeographicalRequirements

The geography required for the application of the straight baseline
system was laid down by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case of 1951.12 The Court held that it is applicable where a coast
is deeply indented and cut into, or where it is bordered by an archipelago such as the Norwegian skjaergaard. The skjaergaard is 120,000
insular formations carved out of a mainland coast, broken by large and
deeply indented fjords, and obliterating any clear dividing line between
the mainland and the sea. Some of the islands are located at some 60
miles from the nearest peninsula on the mainland. This is the geography required in customary law.
On the other hand, the Conventions of 1958 and 1982 would seem
to be somewhat more stringent as to the position of islands, in that
3
they should constitute a fringe in the immediate vicinity of the coast.'
However, the numerous coastal archipelagos to which the straight
baseline system has been applied would indicate that States have interpreted the Convention provisions as a mere codification of existing
14
customary law as applied by the International Court.
12. See 1951 I.C.J. at 128-31.
13. See Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958,
Art. 4, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 512 U.N.T.S. 205; and U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, Art. 7, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, at B28 (K. Simmonds ed., 1983).
14. See a list of some 18 coastal archipelagos, cited by O'Connell, to which the straight baseline system was applied and which would hardly be described as "fringes," in D. O'CONNELL,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 212 (1982).
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Mode of Application

In order to insure the international validity of straight baselines,
the mode of application or actual construction must follow certain criteria. These are intended as guidelines only and may be adapted to
diverse situations. They relate to the direction of the coast, the link
between the land and the sea, and certain economic interests evidenced
by long usage. The first two criteria are compulsory and the third one
is optional. All three were incorporated in the 1958 and 1982 Conventions. No criterion exists as to the length of baselines but, since the
question is often raised in practice, it will be commented upon here.
(a) General Direction of the Coast
The judgment of the Court concludes that while a State must be
allowed the latitude necessary to adapt its delimitation to practical
needs and local requirements, "the drawing of baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast."
The Court readily admitted that the criterion is devoid of any mathematical precision and the coastal State must be allowed a reasonable
degree of flexibility in determining if its straight baselines follow the
general direction of the coast. In the Norwegian situation it held that
the line across the Lopphavet Basin, situated some 19 miles from the
nearest point of land, did not constitute a distortion of the general
direction of the coast. The Court added that the general direction of
the coast is determined by examining a small scale map and, except in
a case of manifest abuse, looking at the coast as a whole. 15
(b)

Close Link Between Land and Sea

There must be a sufficiently close relationship between the land
and the sea areas which are enclosed to subject the latter to the regime
of internal waters.
The Court specified that this close link was a "fundamental consideration"' 6 and the reason is obvious, since the enclosed waters will
acquire the status of internal waters over which the coastal State will
have as complete a sovereignty as it does over its land areas. In other
words, even the right to innocent passage will not apply to the enclosed waters. The Conventions of 1958 and 1982 reproduced literally
this second criterion, but they made an important change as to the
resulting legal regime of the newly enclosed waters. Although these
waters are internal in principle, they will be assimilated to territorial
15. 1951 I.C.J. at 133.
16. Id.
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waters and subject to the right of innocent passage if they had previously been considered as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas.
(c)

Regional Economic Interests Evidenced by Long Usage

When straight baselines meet the two compulsory criteria just discussed, they are validly established. However, in order to add to the
probative value of such criteria, it is permissible to take into account
certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
In the FisheriesCase, the Court invoked this third consideration to
reinforce its conclusion, with respect to the line across the Lopphavet
Basin, that the divergence between the baseline and the land forma17
tions did not constitute a distortion of the general direction of coast.
It stated that, even if there had been a distortion, Norway was justified
in relying on the historic fishing and hunting rights of the local population to add probative value to the line.
(d)

Length of Straight Baselines

It is important to recall that the International Court did not impose any limits as to the length of straight baselines. It was satisfied
that, if a straight baseline can be justified under the two geographical
criteria and possibly also under the economic criterion, the line would
be valid regardless of its length. In the case of the Norwegian Archipelago, the 47 baselines varied from a few hundred yards to what is, in
effect, 62 miles across the Lopphavet, the 62-mile line running 44 and
18 miles on either side of a submerging rock. Both the 1958 and 1982
Conventions are silent as to the length of straight baselines for coastal
archipelagos. It is only in the case of oceanic archipelagos, constituting the national territory of a State, that the 1982 Convention imposes
a limit on the length of baselines. In such a case, the lines must not
normally exceed 100 nautical miles, but up to three percent of the total
number for any archipelago may reach a maximum of 125 nautical

miles. 18
B.

Appraisal of Canada'sArctic Straight Baselines

(1)

Geography of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago

In the Fisheries Case of 1951, the International Court concluded
that the method of straight baselines, devised by Norway, was imposed
17. Id. at 142.
18. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 13, at Art. 47, para. 2.
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by the peculiar geography of the Norwegian coast.' 9 The question
arises here whether the geography of the northern coast of Canada is
of a similarly peculiar nature, so as to warrant the method of straight
baselines for the delimitation of its territorial waters.
All of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago lies north of the Arctic
Circle, except for the southern tip of Baffin Island, and constitutes the
northern coastal zone of Canada (see Figure 2). The Archipelago is
one of the largest in the world and consists of a labyrinth of islands
and headlands of various sizes and shapes. There are 73 major islands,
of more than 50 square miles in area, and some 18,114 smaller ones.
Virtually all of the land formations are mountainous in character.
The western part of the mainland coast is broken by large indentations in the form of bays and gulfs, and the eastern section is deeply
penetrated by a huge inland sea (Hudson Bay) and smaller bays and
basins. Nearly all of these bodies of water are seeded with countless
islands, rocks and reefs. Consequently, the coast of the mainland does
not constitute at all a clear dividing line between land and sea, as it
does in most other countries. In fact, the coast reaches northward as
far as an east-west waterway (Parry Channel) crossing the middle of
the Archipelago; it does so by way of a long northern projection (Boothia Peninsula), barely broken by an extremely narrow strait (Bellot
Strait) to form Somerset Island to the north.
On the north side of Parry Channel, the Queen Elizabeth Islands
are of various sizes and shapes and nearly all of them are deeply indented. The islands are interspaced with bodies of water equally varied in size and shape. This northern section of the Archipelago is
linked with the southern one by a string of five islands lying in a zigzag
fashion across the western portion of Barrow Strait in Parry Channel,
thus forming inter-island passages varying from eight to 15.5 miles.
The islands and peninsulas of the whole Archipelago are fused together by ice formations most of the year, to the point where ice and
land areas often become indistinguishable. The archipelago then
transforms itself into an immense rampart, protecting the continental
part of Canada from the polar ice of the Arctic Ocean and constituting, in effect, the outer coast of the country. The inhabitants of this
barren coastal zone derive their livelihood from hunting and fishing,
crossing the ice and land indifferently by foot, dog sled or snowmobile,
and even using the ice for habitation during their hunting trips.
It is obvious that the northern coast of Canada is bordered by an
archipelago similar in nature to the Norwegian skjaergaard. Not only
19. 1951 I.C.J. at 139.
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is the Archipelago located close to the coast, but there exists a general
interpenetration of land formations and sea areas which is reinforced
by the quasi-permanent presence of ice. The Archipelago might not
constitute a fringe of islands along the coast, as required by the Conventions if interpreted literally (which would be contrary to the practice of States), but it does constitute a most peculiar geography,
making it absolutely impossible to follow the sinuosities of the coast,
or of the islands, in the measurement of territorial waters. It thus renders the use of the straight baseline system absolutely necessary.
(2)

Appraisal of Canada'sArctic Straight Baselines

As shown in Figure 2, baselines begin at the 141st meridian of longitude, proceed in a general easterly direction along the continental
coast of Canada in the Beaufort Sea as far as Baillie Islands off Cape
Bathurst at the entrance of Amundsen Gulf, and continue in a northeasterly direction across the Gulf and along the west side of Banks
Island. They move across M'Clure Strait and along the perimeter of
the Queen Elizabeth Islands as far as the most easterly point of Ellesmere Island in the Lincoln Sea. The baselines then proceed in a general southerly direction along the perimeter of the Islands to Lancaster
Sound, across the Sound and along Bylot and Baffin Islands as far as
Resolution Island at the entrance of Hudson Strait, where they join
the straight line across that Strait established in 1937.
(a) GeneralDirection of the Coast
Considering the triangular shape of the Archipelago, the only possible general direction which straight baselines can follow (after reaching the entrance of Amundsen Gulf) is that of the outer line of the
Archipelago itself. The geographic realities are such that it is absolutely impossible to follow the general easterly direction of the mainland. What really constitutes the Canadian coastline is the outer line
of the Archipelago, in the same way that the International Court considered that what really constituted the Norwegian coastline was the
outer line of the skjaergaard. Consequently, it is unavoidable that the
baselines should follow the outer line or general direction of the
Archipelago.
(b)

Close Link Between Land and Sea

The International Court judged it of fundamental importance that,
as a rule, the sea areas should be sufficiently closely linked to the land
domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. Here again,
however, the Court applied this guideline liberally to at least two areas
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of the Norwegian archipelago, the Lopphavet and Vestfjorden. In a
similar way, the flexibility of this guideline should permit the enclosure of the waters of Amundsen Gulf and Parry Channel.
At least three reasons militate in favor of such a flexibility. First,
the sea to land ratio in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is 0.822 to 1,
considerably better than the 3.5 to 1 ratio for the Norwegian archipelago. Second, the quasi-permanent presence of ice over the enclosed
waters bolsters the physical unity between the land and the sea. Third,
the innocent passage of foreign ships should, and presumably would,
be permitted by Canada. The exclusion of foreign ships being the
main reason for the close link requirement, the latter loses some of its
importance when innocent passage is permitted, and the application of
the requirement should be correspondingly liberalized.
(3)

Regional Economic Interests Evidenced by Long Usage

Although the straight baselines are justified under the two compulsory guidelines just reviewed, Canada is also in a position to invoke
certain economic interests peculiar to some regions, the reality and
importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage. These interests may be relied upon to reinforce the validity of certain baselines,
particularly the 51-mile line across Lancaster Sound at the eastern end
of Parry Channel and the 92-mile line across Amundsen Gulf on the
west side of the Archipelago. Considering that these two bodies of
water are located at either end of the most likely route for the future
shipping envisaged for the Northwest Passage, it becomes particularly
important that the baselines across these water areas be fully justified.
It has now been well established that the Inuit of the Canadian
Arctic have been fishing, hunting and trapping in the waters and on
the sea ice of most of the Archipelago for a very long time. A government-sponsored study on Inuit land use and occupancy completed in
1976 reveals that their traditional sea ice use has covered all of the
waters of the central and eastern Arctic, as well as those of the western
Arctic as far west as Canada's boundary in the Beaufort Sea, and in a
northerly direction up to M'Clure Strait and Viscount Melville
Sound. 20 This traditional hunting and trapping on the sea ice is still
vital to the Inuit economy.
These vital interests have been exercised and enjoyed by the Inuit
for thousands of years. Indeed, archaeologists and anthropologists believe that the Inuit arrived in Canada's western Arctic between 4,000
20. See M. FREEMAN, REPORT:
Gov't Catalogue. No. R2-46/1976.

INUIT LAND USE AND OCCUPANCY PROJECT,

3 vols., Can.
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and 4,500 years ago from Alaska, where their ancestors are presumed
to have migrated from Siberia long before that. 2' There can be no
doubt that the exclusive rights and interests acquired and exercised by
the Inuit, and protected by Canada's laws and regulations are such
that they may be taken into account in support of the validity of the
baselines across Lancaster Sound and Amundsen Gulf.
(4) Length of Straight Baselines
Although there is no maximum length for the straight baselines of
coastal archipelagos, the matter is perhaps of special interest here because of the straits which are involved. It will be noted that the 145
baselines vary from a few hundred yards to 99.5 nautical miles across
M'Clure Strait. An effort was obviously made to restrict the length of
baselines as much as possible and the average is only 16.7 nautical
miles.
III.

STATUS OF THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE BEFORE AND AFTER
THE STRAIGHT BASELINES

A.

Status of the Northwest PassageBefore the Straight Baselines

Because of the difference in the legal regime applicable, it is important to determine whether the Northwest Passage could be characterized as an international strait before its enclosure. If it is, the
applicable freedom of passage is virtually the same as that on the high
seas. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention describes the type of passage applicable to "straits used for international navigation," but does
not say when a strait may be so considered. Fortunately, however, the
International Court did address this question in the Corfu Channel
Case of 1949 and this is still the only international decision on point.
(1) Criteriafor an InternationalStrait
The Court held in the Corfu Channel Case that an international
strait had to meet two criteria, one pertaining to geography and the
22
other to the use or function of the strait.
The geographic criterion is met whenever there is an overlap of territorial waters in the natural passage between adjacent land masses,
joining two parts of the high seas (or exclusive economic zones, since
1982) or a part of the high seas with a territorial sea of a foreign State.
If there is no overlap of territorial waters, and a strip of high seas (or
21. See Schledermann, Inuit Prehistoryand Archaeology, in A CENTURY OF CANADA'S ARCTIC ISLANDS 245, at 253 (M. Zaslow ed. 1981).

22. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 at 28. (Merits).
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economic zone) remains throughout the strait, the principle of the
freedom of the high seas continues to apply. Since a 12-mile territorial
sea is now permitted in international law, a legal strait means one
which is 24 miles or less in width.
The functional criterion relating to the use for international navigation is much more difficult to apply, because the conventions are silent
as to how the required degree of use for international navigation is to
be determined. In holding that the North Corfu Channel was an international strait, the Court found that it had been a very useful route for
international maritime traffic. 23 The evidence showed that the Corfu
Channel had been used by the flags of seven states: Greece, Italy, Rumania, Yugoslavia, France, Albania and the United Kingdom. The
2,884 crossings counted during a 21-month period covered only the
ships which had put in port and had been visited by customs. It did
not include the large number of vessels which went through the strait
without calling at the Port of Corfu. In other words, the actual use of
the North Corfu Channel by foreign ships had been quite extensive.
Such an extensive use does not constitute a threshold, but it is clear
that there has to be some appreciable degree of actual use over a period of time for a waterway to qualify as an international strait.
(2)

Appraisal of the Status of the Passage
Before the Straight Baselines

The geographic criterion is met without difficulty insofar as the
Northwest Passage links two parts of the high seas. Indeed, the eastern end of the Passage leads to Baffin Bay, Davis Strait, the Labrador
Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, whereas the western end leads to the
Beaufort Sea, the Chukchi Sea, the Bering Strait and the Pacific
Ocean. As for the necessity of there being an overlap of territorial
waters, this part of the criterion was also met in 1970 when Canada
extended its territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles which resulted in an
overlap in Barrow Strait.
The fundamental criterion requires that a strait must have been a
useful route for international maritime traffic, as evidenced mainly by
the number of ships using the strait and the number of flags represented, before it can be classified as an international strait. This criterion fails when applied to the Northwest Passage. In its 80-year
history, the Passage has seen only 56 complete transits 24 and of these,
36 were by Canadian ships. The 20 foreign crossings comprised 13
23. Id.
24. See List of Full Transits, Appendix I.
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American ships, 1 Norwegian, 1 Dutch, 1 Japanese, 2 Bahamian, 1
Liberian and 1 British. The historic Norwegian crossing by Amundsen was one of discovery, the Dutch and Japanese were adventure
crossings and the Bahamian and Liberian were pleasure cruises. Aside
from the first discovery crossing, these non-American transits were
preceded by a request and grant of authorization.
As for the 13 American transits, 3 of them were accomplished by a
squadron of icebreakers in 1957, performing hydrographic surveys
during the joint Canadian-American establishment of the Distant
Early Warning System, and all three ships were led through the narrow Bellot Strait by the HMCS Labrador. Two American submarine
crossings took place to test the feasibility of submerged transits of the
Northwest Passage. The USS Seadragon in 1960 had a Canadian representative aboard in the person of Commodore 0. C. S. Robertson,
and the USS Skate in 1962 made its crossing within the context of USCanada defense arrangements. Five of the other eight American transits were made in 1969, when the S/T Manhattan tanker loaded with
water made its feasibility voyage in Route 1 and was accompanied for
part of the voyage by the US icebreakers Staten Island and Northwind.
The Manhattan had a Canadian representative aboard in the person of
Captain T. C. Pullen, and was escorted by the Canadian icebreaker
John A. Macdonald. The 1985 crossing by the PolarSea was not preceded by a request for authorization, but the two 1988 American
crossings were. One was by a 64 foot yacht and the other was by the
Polar Star.
It is clear from the above review that by no stretch of the imagination could the Northwest Passage be classified as an international
strait. Those who maintain that the Passage may be so classified obviously confuse actual use with potential use. The latter test is the one
used by American courts to determine whether a waterway is navigable or not. This is not the criterion of actual use required in international law and applied by the International Court. 25 In addition, it
must be pointed out that, with the possible exception of the cruise
ships Lindblad Explorer and World Explorer (both of which asked
permission), not one of the few foreign transits could be characterized
as constituting commercial navigation.
The conclusion that the Passage is not an international strait, however, does not mean that no right of passage existed before the drawing
of straight baselines. Being territorial seas or high seas (or exclusive
economic zone), the traditional right of innocent passage had to apply.
25. On the importance of the actual use, see D.

O'CONNELL,

supra note 14, at 308.

Spring 1989]

Canada's Sovereignty Over the Northwest Passage

671

It was applicable at least as much as in any territorial waters, since
these were part of a strait. Of course, such strait not being used for
international navigation, the right of innocent passage could be suspended for security reasons.
B.

Status of the Northwest PassageAfter the Straight Baselines

Three questions must be addressed: (1) Is there a right of passage
since the straight baselines? (2) Could the Northwest Passage become
an international strait? and (3) What right of passage would apply if
the Northwest Passage is internationalized?
(1)

Is There a Right of PassageSince the Straight Baselines?

Under customary international law, as applied by the International
Court in the FisheriesCase, there is no right of passage in waters enclosed by straight baselines. This is the result regardless of the previous status of the newly enclosed waters. However, the straight
baseline system was modified in this respect when incorporated in the
1958 Territorial Sea Convention. The latter made the enclosed waters
subject to the right of innocent passage if they were previously territorial waters or high seas. Since Canada is not a Party to the Convention, it would naturally rely on customary law for the validity of its
straight baselines and the resulting legal status of internal waters, if
that status cannot rest on an historic title. Such reliance might not be
completely secure, however, when one considers the possibility of the
1958 Convention provision having become part of customary law.
The 1958 Convention came into force in 1964, with 22 ratifications. Since then, the number of ratifications, accessions and secessions has raised the membership to 45. These 45 States, however,
include only 21 of the 60 States which have actually used the straight
baseline system and only 2 of the additional 12 which have adopted
enabling legislation. In other words, there are 49 States that have actually used straight baselines or have adopted enabling legislation but
have not become parties to the Convention.
It seems impossible to conclude that the acceptance of the 1958
provision for innocent passage in newly enclosed internal waters has
been so general as to become legally binding on all States. The International Court made it clear in the Gulf of Maine Case of 1984, that
much more was required before reaching an affirmative conclusion as
to the existence of customary law. It held, in that case, that the equidistance method of continental shelf delimitation had not become a
rule of customary law, nor had it been adopted into such law even as a
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method to be given preference over others. 26 The Court so held in
spite of the fact that the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, which
provided for such rule, had been in force since 1964 and some 54
States were parties to it. In addition, the great majority of at least 80
delimitation agreements, concluded since 1958, had been based on the
equidistance method, either strict or modified. Consequently, it is
highly unlikely that the Court would hold that Article 5 of the Territorial Sea Convention has become binding on all States on the basis of
a newly created customary rule. It is all the more unlikely that the
provision represented an important departure from existing customary
law. Accordingly, the conclusion is that no right of innocent passage
exists in the newly enclosed waters of the Northwest Passage. Should
the 1982 Law of the Sea eventually enter into force and Canada ratify
it, the conclusion would remain the same since those waters would
have already been considered internal waters before such entry into
force.
(2)

Could the Northwest PassageBecome an InternationalStrait?

The possible internationalization of the Northwest Passage will depend on the degree of international navigation and the measures which
Canada will take to exercise control over such navigation.
(a) InternationalNavigation
International navigation has already begun in the eastern part of
the Passage to transport minerals from Nanisivik Mine, south of Lancaster Sound, and Polaris Mine, north of Barrow Strait. Also, it seems
to be only a question of time before regular shipping takes place from
Melville Island, north of Viscount Melville Sound, and from the
Beaufort Sea along the full length of the Northwest Passage. Oil will
probably come from both the Canadian and the Alaskan sides of the
Beaufort Sea.
Although the threshold use in the Corfu Channel Case of 1951 was
fairly high, a considerably lower threshold would probably suffice for
the Northwest Passage. Because of special factors such as the remoteness of the region, the difficulties of navigation and the absence of alternative routes, comparatively little use might be required. A pattern
of international shipping across the Passage, developed over relatively
few years, might be held sufficient to make it international. It has
already been recognized by the Permanent Court of International Jus26. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Case, (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 245 at 297, para. 107., (Oct. 12, 1984).
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tice in the Eastern Greenland Case of 1933, that the application of
general principles of law to the Arctic regions must take into account
27
the special local conditions.
(b)

Possible Control Measures

An internationalization of the Passage presumes, of course, that
Canada would allow the passage of foreign ships, without taking appropriate measures to insure effective control over such ships and the
waters in question. It must be remembered that, although the enclosure of those waters has resulted in a sovereignty for Canada which is
as complete as over the islands, such sovereignty must be maintained
and this can only be done by the exercise of effective control. This
means that certain control measures must be taken.
A first such measure should be the immediate construction of the
class 8 icebreaker already decided upon. This will greatly assist Canada in providing the full range of sea and land based services that are
required for safe navigation in those ice-covered waters. Such services
should be ready when the Northwest Passage is used for commercial
navigation and would play a key role in affirming Canada's presence
and control.
A second measure should be the conclusion of bilateral agreements
with foreign shippers setting out the conditions for the use of the Passage. Those agreements would recognize Canada's sovereignty over
the Northwest Passage and provide for the conditions to be met by
foreign shippers, such as the use of Canadian icebreaking and,
possibly, pilotage services. A bilateral agreement of this nature was
discussed with the United States but an agreement of a different nature
was concluded. The Canada-United States Agreement on Arctic cooperation signed in Ottawa on January 11, 1988, does not recognize
Canada's sovereignty over the waters of its Arctic Archipelago and
covers navigation by icebreakers only. In addition, it specifies that
"nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavour between Arctic
neighbours and friends nor any practice thereunder affects the
respective positions of the Governments of the United States and of

Canada. ."28
A third step should be the development of an effective submarinal
detection and control capability. Whether this means necessarily the
acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines remains in question. The
27. See generally Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B)
No. 53 (Apr. 5).
28. See text of the Agreement annexed to News Release, No. 010, January 11, 1988, published by the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.
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policy of the present Government, as announced in its recent White
Paper on National Defense, supports such an acquisition. 29 Although
such use of nuclear energy might be legally permissible, it is far from
certain that nuclear-powered submarines are absolutely necessary to
prevent the internationalization of the Passage. It could be that stateof-the-art continued diesel-electric submarines, combined with fixed
30
sonar arrays in strategic positions, might be sufficient.
(3)

What Right of Passage Would Apply If the Northwest Passage is
Internationalized?

At the insistence of the major Maritime Powers and as part of an
integral package, a consensus was reached at the Third Law of the Sea
Conference as to the type of passage applicable in straits used for international navigation. This new right, incorporated in the 1982 Convention and called "transit passage," is one of freedom of navigation and
overflight. It may be exercised by all ships, 3 1 including warships in
general and submarines in particular in their normal mode of navigation.32 More specifically, if the Northwest Passage were internationalized, submarines of all States (Soviet as well as American) would be
completely within their navigational rights under the ice.
Of course, the sixty ratifications necessary to bring the 1982 Convention into force are far from having been attained and transit passage is not yet part of customary international law. However, State
practice might well develop in that direction and eventually materialize into a rule of customary law. This would be particularly so if major maritime powers follow such a practice and the other States
directly affected do not protest. In this regard, the United States has
given certain indications that it intends to follow that course.
In his Proclamation of an exclusive economic zone in March,
1983, the President of the United States stated that "unimpeded commercial and military navigation and overflight are critical to the national interest of the United States" and added that it would "continue
' 33
to act to insure the retention of the necessary rights and freedoms.
The President also warned at the same time that the United States will
not "acquiesce in unilateral acts of other States designed to restrict the
29. See, Department of National Defense, Ottawa, Challenge and Commitment, A Defense
Policyfor Canada, at 52-53 (1987).
30. See the Executive Briefing entitled The AMPS-Powered SSn, The CanadianAlternative to
the Acquisition of Foreign Nuclear Submarine Technology, by ECS Group of Companies, a Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defense, Spring, 1988.
31. See Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 13, at art. 38.
32. Id., art. 39.

33. Proclamation reproduced in 22 I.L.M. at 162 (1983).
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rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and
overflight and other related high seas uses."' 34 A refusal to acquiesce
was certainly present in the position adopted by the United States at
the time of the PolarSea incident in August, 1985.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion which follows from the above analysis may be formulated in three propositions:
1. Canada's claim of an historic title to the waters of the Canadian
Arctic Archipelago is of doubtful validity.
2. Canada's straight baselines, established around the perimeter of
the Canadian Arctic Archipelago in September, 1985, are valid
3 5
in international law.
3. The Northwest Passage is a Canadian national waterway since
its enclosure by straight baselines, without any right of passage;
however, if adequate control measures are not taken, it could
become an international strait and the new right of transit passage would eventually apply.
34. See Leich, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 77
AM. J. INT'L L. 616, 620 (1983).
35. For a similar conclusion, see Killas, The Legality of Canada'sClaims to the Waters of its
Arctic Archipelago, 19 OTTAWA L. REV. 95 (1987), and McKinnon, Arctic Baselines: A Litore
Usque Ad Litus, 66 CAN. BAR REV. 790 (1987).
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Appendix
LIST OF FULL TRANSITS OF THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE*
(1903 TO 1988)
NO.

YEAR

NAME OF SHIP

REGISTRY

ROUTE AND
DIRECTION

TYPE OF SHIP

1
2

1903-06
1940-42

GJOA
ST. ROCH

Norway
Canada

3A west.
3A & 4, east.

herring boat
schooner

3

1944

ST. ROCH

Canada

1, west.

schooner

4

1954

Canada

1, west.

5

1957

HMCS
LABRADOR
USCGS STORIS

USA

3A & 4, east.

naval
icebreaker
icebreaker

6
7

1957
1957

USA
USA

3A & 4, east.
3A & 4, east.

icebreaker
icebreaker

8

1960

USCGS SPAR
USCGS
BRAMBLE
USS

USA

2, west.

nuclear
submarine

NATURE OF
VOYAGE

exploration
patrol &
exploration
patrol &
exploration
sovereignty &
survey
hydrographic
survey
led through Bellot
Strait by HMCS

9

1962

USS SKATE

USA

2, east.

nuclear
submarine

10

1967

CCGS JOHN A.

Canada

3, west.

icebreaker

1, west.

tanker

Canada

1, west.

icebreaker

USA

1, east.

tanker

Labrador
exploration of
submerged route,
within Canada/US
defence
arrangements
exploration of
submerged route,
within Canada/US
defence
arrangements
assist CCGS
Camsell in
MacKenzie Bay &
USCGS Northwind
n. of Pt. Barrow
test Passage for
large tanker, with
Can. Navy Capt.
T.C. Pullen aboard
escort and assist
Manhattan
return voyage

USA

3, east.

icebreaker

rendez-vous &

Canada

1, east.

icebreaker

support Manhattan
support Manhattan

USA

1, east.

icebreaker

support Manhattan

USA

3, west.

icebreaker

return to Seattle

SEADRAGON

MACDONALD

11

1969

S/T
MANHATTAN

12

1969

CCGS JOHN A.
MACDONALD

13

1969

S/T
MANHATTAN

14

1969

USCGS
NORTHWIND

15

1969

16

1969

CCGS JOHN A.
MACDONALD

USCGS STATEN
ISLAND

17

1969

USSGS
NORTHWIND

18
19

1970
1970

CSS BAFFIN
CSs HUDSON

Canada
Canada

1, east.
1, east.

survey ship
survey ship

survey
survey (first
circum. of
Americas)

20

1975

Canada

3A & 4, east.

icebreaker

21

1975

CCGS
SKIDEGATE
CCGS JOHN A.
MACDONALD

Canada

3, west.

icebreaker

redeployed to east
coast
assist CCGS
Camsell & Beaver
Mackenzie in
Beaufort Sea
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1975

23

1975

24
25

1975
1976

26

1976
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Canada

3, east.

icebreaker

return to east coast

Canada

3 & 5, east.

survey ship

survey

Canada
Canada

3 & 5, east.
3, west.

survey ship
drill ship

Canada

3, east.

icebreaker

WILLIWAW
J.E.
BERNIER II
CCGS PIERRE
RADISSON
CCGS JOHN A.
MACDONALD
CCGS JOHN .A.
MACDONALD
MV KIGORIAK

Netherlands
Canada

3A, west.
3A, west.

yacht
yacht

survey
drill for Dome in
Beaufort Sea
redeployed to east
coast
adventure
adventure

Canada

1, east.

icebreaker

Canada

1, west.

icebreaker

Canada

1, east.

icebreaker

Canada

1, west.

icebreaker

CCGS JOHN A.
MACDONALD
MV
PANDORA II
MV THETA
CANMAR
EXPLORER II

CCGS I.E.
BERNIER

27
28

1977
1977-78

29

1978

30

1978

31

1979

32

1979

33

1979

CCGS LOUIS
ST-LAURENT

Canada

1, west.

icebreaker

34

1980

ccos I.E.
BERNIER

Canada

3A, east.

icebreaker

35

1980

Canada

3A, east.

survey

36

1981

MV
PANDORA ii
css HUDSON

Canada

3, east.

survey

37

1981

MORGAN

Canada*

3A, east.

Boston

support for Dome
in Beaufort Sea
assist CCGS
Franklin in Visc.
Melville Sd
returning to
Quebec from
Beaufort Sea
redeployed to east
coast
return to east coast
from survey off
west coast
adventure

3A & 4, west.
3, east.
3A, east.
3A, west

whaler
yacht
tug
survey ship
cruise ship

adventure
supply
survey
pleasure trip St.

STANLEY

38
39
40
41

1979-82
1983
1983
1984

redeployed to east
coast
charter to Dome in
Beaufort Sea
return from charter

MERMAID
ARCTIC SHIKO
POLAR CIRCLE
M/S

Japan
Canada
Canada
Bahamian

LINDBLAD

(Swedish

John's to

EXPLORER

owned)

Yokohama;
permission
requested
pleasure trip Nome
to Halifax;
permission

42

1985

M/S WORLD
DISCOVERER

Liberian

3, east.

cruise ship

43

1985

USCGS POLAR

USA

1, west.

icebreaker

Canada

3, west.

icebreaker

Canada

3, east.

icebreaker

USA

4, east.

yacht

requested
SEA

44

1985

CCGS JOHN A.
MACDONALD

45

1985

46

1988

CCGS JOHN A.
MACDONALD
BELVEDERE

redeployed from
Thule to Chukchi
Sea for survey
work; permission
not requested
assist CCGS
Camsell in
Beaufort Sea
return to east coast
adventure;
permission
requested
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1988

VAGABOND II

British

4, east.

yacht

48

1988

HENRY

Canada

3, east.

icebreaker

Bahamas

4, east.

cruise ship

Canada

3, west.

drill ship

Canada

3, west.

icebreaker

Canada

3, west.

icebreaker

USA

3, east.

icebreaker

Canada

3, east.

icebreaker

Canada

3, east.

icebreaker

Canada

3, east.

icebreaker

LARSEN

49

1988

SOCIETY
EXPLORER

50

1988

CANMAR
EXPLORER Ill

51

1988

PIERRE
RADISSON

52

1988

JOHN A.
MACDONALD

53

1988

USCG POLAR
STAR

54

1988

JOHN A.
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adventure (first
British ship to
cross Passage);
permission
requested
redeployment, to
Halifax
pleasure trip
(formerly Lindblad
Explorer);
permission
requested
to drill in Beaufort
Sea (broken
voyage)
to assist Martha L.
Black north of
Alaska
to provide
logistical support
for Polar Star
blocked by ice
north of Alaska,
exiting east; Can.
Coast Guard
Officer aboard and
permission
requested
to escort Polar Star

MACDONALD

55

1988

PIERRE
RADISSON

56

1988

CCGS MARTHA
L. BLACK

escorted Martha L.
Black back
eastward
blocked by ice
north of alaska,
exiting east

* The Northwest Passage here is limited to the constricted waters of the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago between Baffin Bay and Beaufort Sea.
** Ship bought in Vancouver just prior to crossing and presumably of Canadian registry, see R.
FIENNES, TO THE ENDS OF THE EARTH 158 (1983).

Summary of transits per flag
36
20

Canadian
Foreign
13 American
I Norwegian
I Dutch
I Japanese
2 Bahamian
1 Liberian
I British

